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Non-technical Summary 
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate 
policy, this paper empirically examines the importance of equity in this field. Our analysis 
shows that equity issues are considered highly important in international climate negotiations 
and that the polluter-pays rule (i.e., the rule of equal ratio between abatement costs and 
emissions) and the accompanying poor losers rule (i.e., the rule of exemption due to GDP) are 
the most widely accepted equity principles. Using ordinal and (uni- and multivariate) binary 
probit models we find a strong influence of the economic or emission performance of the 
agents’ country on the importance of equity issues and principles: (i) Equity issues are seen as 
more important by individuals from G77 countries (including China) or from countries with 
less current per capita GDP and less future per capita CO2 emissions. (ii) Agents from richer 
countries are less in favor of incorporating the polluter-pays and the ability-to-pay principle in 
future international climate agreements. (iii) The poor losers rule is more strongly supported 
by individuals from G77/China countries or by individuals from countries with less current 
per capita GDP.  
While most of our estimation results are consistent with pure economic self-interest or, in 
other words, with interests in reducing the cost burdens for the respective countries, the 
support for the egalitarian principle (i.e., the rule of equal per capita emissions) runs contrary 
to the hypothesis of economic self-interest: In a short-term time horizon of no more than 20 
years no significant effect of the economic performance variables arises while in a long-term 
time horizon of more than 20 years agents from richer countries are more in favor of 
incorporating this equity principle. Furthermore, the effect of the economic performance 
variables on the desired degree of incorporating the polluter-pays principle interestingly 
becomes less significant in the long-run. Given the idea that equity or fairness arguments can 
be a basis for international climate agreements if there is a consensus of countries about what 
is fair, our estimation results indicate that future international climate agreements could 
possibly be based on a combination of the polluter-pays, the egalitarian, and the poor losers 
rule. 
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Abstract 
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate 
policy, this paper empirically analyzes the importance of equity in this field. We find that 
equity issues are considered highly important in international climate negotiations and that the 
polluter-pays rule and the accompanying poor losers rule are the most widely accepted equity 
principles. Our econometric analysis shows a strong influence of the economic or emission 
performance of the agents’ country on the importance of equity issues and principles: (i) 
Equity issues are seen as more important by individuals from G77/China countries or from 
countries with less current per capita GDP and less future per capita CO2 emissions. (ii) 
Agents from richer countries are less in favor of incorporating the polluter-pays and the 
ability-to-pay principle in future international climate agreements. (iii) The poor losers rule is 
more strongly supported by individuals from G77/China countries or by individuals from 
countries with less current per capita GDP. While these results are consistent with pure 
economic self-interest, the support for the egalitarian principle runs contrary to economic 
intuition: In the long-run, agents from richer countries are more in favor of incorporating the 
egalitarian principle. Furthermore, the effect of the economic performance variables on the 
desired degree of incorporating the polluter-pays principle interestingly becomes less 
significant in the long-run. This indicates that future international climate agreements could 
possibly be based on a combination of the polluter-pays, the egalitarian, and the poor losers 
rule. 
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Equity: “Etymology: … from Latin aequitat-, aequitas, from aequus equal, fair” 
“justice according to natural law or right; specifically: freedom from bias or favoritism” 
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary) 
 
1. Introduction 
Solving social dilemmas as they arise in the provision of public goods or the management of 
common resources frequently requires voluntary cooperation among the parties involved. 
While economists have often concentrated on the question of efficiency and analyzed 
mechanisms to obtain optimal provision levels, they have given less attention to the notion of 
distributive fairness or equity. This is different in the political arena: In a world where no 
single party will provide the common good in sufficient quantity and no institution exists to 
enforce cooperation, an agreement will only be accepted by the parties if it is perceived to be 
fair. The international negotiations on the mitigation of climate change are one prominent 
example. Already a quick glance at international climate policy indicates a vital role of equity 
as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change recognizes the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. A look at statements by agents 
from different countries shows that some of them are concerned with equity issues. Notions 
like “equal per capita emissions”, “polluter-pays”, or “sovereignty” all stem from specific 
views on equity.  
Cazorla and Toman (2001), Ringius et al. (2002), Najama et al. (2003), and others study the 
role of equity issues and fairness in international climate policy. The link between equity 
interest and the prospects of international cooperation is explored by Lange and Vogt (2003) 
and Lange (2006). They show that equity preferences of the different negotiating parties can 
increase cooperation rates compared with the relatively pessimistic predictions from 
traditional economic models of coalition formation (Barrett, 1992, 1994; Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel, 1993). Similarly, Ringius et al. (2002) state that “notions of fairness 
can provide a basis for an international regime only if there is a certain minimum of 
consensus among its members about what is fair and what is unfair”. In identifying several 
equity rules which are frequently used in international climate policy, they conclude that there 
is limited empirical research on which principles are widely accepted and why they play a role 
in the climate negotiations. Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents 
involved in international climate policy, our paper attempts to close this gap in the literature. 
We analyze the importance of equity issues in general as well as the importance of different 
equity rules. 
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Our empirical analysis shows that equity issues are considered highly important in 
international climate negotiations and that the polluter-pays rule (i.e., the rule of equal ratio 
between abatement costs and emissions) and the accompanying poor losers rule (i.e., the rule 
of exemption due to GDP) are the most widely accepted equity principles. Using ordinal and 
(uni- and multivariate) binary probit models we find a strong influence of the economic or 
emission performance of the agents’ country on the importance of equity issues and 
principles: Equity issues are seen as more important by individuals from G77 countries 
(including China) or from countries with less current per capita GDP and less future per capita 
CO2 emissions. Furthermore, agents from richer countries are less in favor of incorporating 
the polluter-pays and the ability-to-pay principle in future international climate agreements. 
Finally, the poor losers rule is more strongly supported by individuals from G77/China 
countries or by individuals from countries with less current per capita GDP.  
While these results are consistent with pure economic self-interest, the support for the 
egalitarian principle (i.e., the rule of equal per capita emissions) runs contrary to economic 
intuition: In a short-term time horizon of no more than 20 years no significant effect of the 
economic performance variables arises while in a long-term time horizon of more than 20 
years agents from richer countries are even more in favor of incorporating this equity 
principle. Furthermore, the effect of the economic performance variables on the desired 
degree of incorporating the polluter-pays principle interestingly becomes less significant in 
the long-run. This indicates that future international climate agreements could possibly be 
based on a combination of the polluter-pays, the egalitarian, and the poor losers rule. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an outline of equity issues and 
principles in international climate policy. In section 3, the data and the variables for the 
empirical analysis are described. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Equity issues and principles in international climate policy 
The frequent use of equity arguments in international environmental negotiations could, at 
first glance, seem puzzling to economists who usually assume that agents are exclusively 
concerned with the economic costs and benefits of the respective country. According to 
Ringius et al. (2002), equity issues can enter the negotiation position in different ways: As a 
preference as actors might dislike being treated or treating others unfairly, as constraints on 
the substantiation of bargaining positions, or as guidance when the economic consequences 
are uncertain.  
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The nature of the climate change problem allows decomposing policy decisions into those on 
the climate target (i.e., the aggregate greenhouse gas emission reductions) and those on the 
distribution of cost burdens which is crucial in evaluating the equity consequences of any 
given proposal. While the strength of the climate target is certainly a major criterion for the 
acceptability of any future international climate agreement, negotiations in the past centered 
to a large extent around questions on how the burdens of some global abatement effort should 
be distributed. For example, developing countries as well as environmental interest groups in 
industrialized countries claim that developed countries with high per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions are responsible for global warming and must take the lead in combating climate 
change. As a consequence, weaker obligations or complete exemptions of developing 
countries from emission reduction targets can be based on equity arguments. Another 
dimension of equity issues is concerned with a fair distribution of burdens among countries 
with comparable per capita GDP and industry structure. Here, often similar reduction targets 
are seen as fair: Some proposals during the international climate negotiations allocated 
emission reduction targets based on present or recent emission levels (Raymond, 2003).  
Several studies identify different typologies of equity principles. Rose et al. (1998) distinguish 
allocation-based, outcome-based, and process-based criteria. In this paper we concentrate on 
allocation- and outcome-based criteria. Recognizing that most of the criteria can be further 
specified and thereby subdivided, we follow Ringius et al. (2002) in that we concentrate on 
main equity principles which dominate the political and the academic debate on international 
climate policy: 
• The egalitarian rule: This rule incorporates the principle of equal per capita emissions. It 
implies that a country whose population amounts to x% of the global population should 
get x% of the global entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions. 
• The sovereignty rule: This rule incorporates the principle of equal percentage reduction of 
current emissions. It implies that a country whose greenhouse gas emissions amount to 
x% of the global greenhouse gas emissions should get x% of the global entitlements for 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
• The polluter-pays rule: This rule incorporates the principle of equal ratio between 
abatement costs and emissions. It implies that a country whose greenhouse gas emissions 
amount to x% of the global emissions should bear x% of the global abatement costs for 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. 
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• The ability-to-pay rule: This rule incorporates the principle of equal ratio between 
abatement costs and GDP. It implies that a country whose GDP amounts to x% of global 
gross product should bear x% of the global abatement costs for reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
Besides these main equity rules there are often two further, accompanying principles 
discussed, namely (as we call them) the poor losers rule and the stand alone criterion:  
• The poor losers rule can be seen as a principle of exemption due to GDP. It states that a 
poor country is exempted from any obligation for greenhouse gas emission reductions 
until a certain level of GDP per capita compared with the respective average of developed 
countries is reached.  
• The stand alone rule can be seen as a principle of no excessive emission entitlements. It 
states that the entitlements for greenhouse gas emissions of a country are not higher than 
its business-as-usual greenhouse gas emissions. 
Obviously, the view on the importance of equity issues and the desired incorporation of 
certain equity principles in international climate policy can differ across people and countries 
for several reasons. The use of specific equity arguments can be strategically motivated, for 
example, to avoid or weaken binding emission reduction targets for the individual’s country. 
In this case, equity arguments do not come into play because of an intrinsic real fairness 
orientation but rather because of pure economic self-interest. In particular, the egalitarian and 
polluter-pays rules also serve the self-interest of developing countries as they have low per 
capita emissions and a much smaller historical aggregate of emissions. Similarly, individuals 
from poor countries could use the ability-to-pay and poor losers principles in their economic 
self-interest. For such countries it is therefore hard or even impossible to disentangle equity 
arguments from self-interest unless they support other equity principles as well. The use of the 
sovereignty rule could be serving the economic self-interest to refuse stricter emission 
reduction targets than other negotiation parties are willing to accept. 
Equity arguments could further be used as a means to facilitate negotiations. The idea behind 
this might be that equity principles may serve as focal points (Schelling, 1960) which reduce 
negotiation costs. This argument might gain particular importance in international climate 
policy as a true assessment of costs and benefits seems impossible due to the large 
uncertainties and the long-term nature of the climate change problem. 
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Finally, fairness considerations of the public in the individual’s country could also play a 
more direct role for the use of specific equity arguments. As international climate negotiations 
are (sometimes) highly recognized by the public at home, a government that is interested in 
re-election has to, at least to some degree, take voters’ preferences into account. Hence, 
national voters’ preferences may indirectly influence the outcome of international climate 
negotiations (for a more detailed discussion see Congleton, 1992; Vogt, 2002; Lange and 
Vogt, 2003; Böhringer and Vogt, 2004).  
In this paper we empirically analyze the importance of equity in international climate policy. 
We explicitly consider the desired degree of incorporation of the different equity rules which 
have been described above. These views of agents involved in international climate policy are 
then interacted with characteristics of the agents’ countries of origin. Based on economic self-
interest, individuals from less developed (poorer) countries are predicted to be more likely to 
use equity principles like egalitarian, polluter-pays, ability-to-pay, and poor losers as the 
application of all of them reduces the financial burdens on their countries.  
The importance of the respective equity rule may also change over time. While a strict 
application of a single rule (e.g., the egalitarian principle) can involve huge wealth transfers 
and thereby prohibitively high costs for industrialized countries in the short-run, the use of the 
same rule might get feasible in the long-run. In this vein, prominent proposals like 
“contraction and convergence” combine different equity principles and shift their respective 
weight as a function of time. Therefore, we also analyze the stated degree of incorporation of 
the equity rules in international climate policy in the short-term and long-term time horizon. 
 
3. Data and variables 
The data for our empirical analysis stem from a world-wide survey which was carried out 
with the help of a standardized questionnaire and which was sent in 2004 via e-mail to 1695 
agents involved in climate policy. The e-mail addresses of the agents were taken from official 
UN documents available on the Internet such as from different climate policy and IPCC 
workshops. The participants obtained an individual login and password for an Internet 
questionnaire. This procedure of sending out passwords allowed us to control the access to the 
survey and, in particular, ensured that each participant could fill out the questionnaire only 
once. Alternatively, the participants could fill out a Word-document or PDF and send it back 
via e-mail or postal mail. 
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Our empirical analysis is based on the data of the first part of the questionnaire in which we 
study the personal views on equity.1 After explaining the six equity rules (see previous 
section), agents were first surveyed on the importance of equity issues in international climate 
policy (we differentiate between “Very high importance”, “High importance”, “Moderate 
importance”, “Low importance”, and “No importance”). We derive a corresponding ordinal 
variable “Importance” which comprises integers from one to four for our empirical analysis 
whereby the value four designates “Very high importance” and the value one designates “Low 
importance” or “No importance”. We also consider two dummy variables “Very high 
importance” and “Very high or high importance” derived from this ordinal variable regarding 
the importance of equity issues in international climate negotiations. 
Second we asked which of the four main equity rules “Egalitarian”, “Sovereignty”, “Polluter-
pays”, or “Ability-to-pay” comes nearest to the personal definition of equity in international 
climate negotiations. Furthermore, we asked whether “Poor losers” and “Stand alone” should 
be applied as accompanying rules besides the main equity rules.  
Third we asked for each of the six equity rules to which degree it should be incorporated in 
any future international climate agreement (we differentiate between “Very high degree”, 
“High degree”, “Moderate degree”, “Low degree”, and “No degree”). We also differentiate 
between the consideration of a short-term time horizon of no more than 20 years and the 
consideration of a long-term time horizon of more than 20 years concerning the desired 
degree of incorporation of the equity principles. For both time horizons, we derive a 
corresponding ordinal variable “Degree” which comprises integers from one to five whereby 
the value five designates “Very high degree” and the value one designates “No degree”. We 
also consider two dummy variables “Very high degree” and “Very high or high degree” 
derived from this ordinal variable.  
Finally, the questionnaire contains some questions about the individual’s background. In 
particular, we surveyed the nationality, but furthermore also the participation in a Conference 
of the Parties (COP) or a meeting of the subsidiary bodies, the field of the highest educational 
degree or training, the age, the gender, and the type of organization the agents work for. The 
individual nationality is the basis for variables of the economic and environmental (regarding 
future per capita CO2 emissions) performance of the respondent’s country. For international 
                                                          
1 The questionnaire consists of two parts. While the first part addresses the individual views on equity, the 
second part studies the perceptions on the equity views of different countries or groups of countries that play an 
important role in international climate negotiations. By addressing the views on countries’ positions, the second 
part methodologically differs from the first part. We therefore leave the analysis of the corresponding data to 
future research. 
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climate policy perhaps most important is the difference between the group of 77 countries 
(including China) and other countries. Therefore, the dummy variable “G77/China” takes the 
value one if the respondent’s nationality is from these countries. However, to better account 
for the economic or emission performance of countries, we consider two additional variables 
in our empirical analysis. The variable “GDP per capita” denotes for each respondent the last 
available per capita GDP (in ten thousand $) of the respective country of origin from the Penn 
World Table (Heston et al., 2002) since 1995 (most data stem from 2000). The variable “CO2 
per capita” denotes for each respondent the projections of the per capita CO2 emissions of the 
respective country in 2010. These future emission levels (for groups of countries) are based 
on the worldwide energy model POLES (Criqui et al., 1996; Criqui, 2001). In the econometric 
analysis we only include one of these three economic and emission performance variables due 
to the strong correlations between “G77/China”, “GDP per capita”, and “CO2 per capita” 
which can lead to multicollinearity problems. Furthermore, we do not only analyze the per 
capita GDP of the respective country but also the corresponding total GDP (“GDP”) (in one 
trillion $). This control variable can be interpreted as a mixture of the economic performance 
and size of the respondents’ countries. 
Concerning the other aforementioned questions about the individual background, the dummy 
variable “COP” takes the value one if the respondent participated in a COP or a meeting of 
the subsidiary bodies. Regarding the educational degree, we make a distinction between social 
scientists and others. The dummy variable “Social science” takes the value one if the 
respondent’s highest degree or training is in political sciences, economic/business 
administration, or law.2 The dummy variable “Gender” takes the value one if the respondent 
is female.3 Finally, the dummy variable “NGO” takes the value one if the respondent works 
for environmental or non-environmental NGO and the variable “Age” denotes the natural 
logarithm of the respondent’s age (in years).  
The summary statistics for the basic explanatory variables which are used in our econometric 
analysis are reported in Table 1. It should be noted that although 230 out of the 1695 
contacted persons participated in the survey, some of the participants did not answer all 
questions. As a consequence, the number of observations in the empirical analysis is smaller. 
                                                          
2 The individual educational background could potentially influence the view on equity. Studies from 
experimental economics and psychology indicate differences in (cooperative) behavior between economists and 
non-economists. Marwell and Ames (1981) are among the first that report significant behavioral differences 
between economists and non-economists, many following studies confirmed their results (e.g., Carter and Irons, 
1991; Frank et al., 1993, 1996).  
3 Gender effects are often seen as a determinant of social behavior. In the experimental economics literature, a 
gender effect has, for example, been observed by Eckel and Grossman (1996a, 1996b). 
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Table 1 shows, for example, that almost half of the respondents come from G77/China 
countries. Furthermore, about two thirds of the respondents have participated in a COP or a 
meeting of the subsidiary bodies and about one fifth of the respondents are female. Regarding 
the variable “Age” the mean in Table 1 corresponds to an average age of 45.7 years amongst 
the 183 respondents. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The general importance of equity issues in international climate negotiations 
We start analyzing the general importance of equity issues in international climate 
negotiations. Table 2 reports the absolute and relative frequencies of answers for all 
respondents as well as distinguished between respondents from G77/China countries and 
those from other countries. More than 90% of respondents state at least a moderate 
importance, independently of the respondent’s country of origin. However, the frequencies for 
“Very high importance” strongly differ between individuals from G77/China countries 
(52.38%) and other countries (26%). In other words, respondents from G77/China countries 
emphasize the very high importance of equity issues to a clearly larger extent than 
respondents from other countries. However, the relative frequencies for “Very high or high 
importance” do not strongly differ between agents from G77/China countries (78.57%) and 
agents from other countries (73.00%). 
Evidence for these results can also be found in Table 3 which reports the correlation 
coefficients between the stated importance of equity issues in international climate 
negotiations and nationality: The positive correlation coefficient between “G77/China” and 
“Very high importance” is rather high and different from zero at all common levels of 
significance compared with the correlation coefficient between “G77/China” and “Very high 
or high importance” which is not different from zero even at the 10% level of significance. 
Table 3 additionally considers the ordinal variable “Importance” (in this respect, Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient is applied) and the economic and emission performance variables 
“GDP per capita” and “CO2 per capita”. According to this, the poorer the individual’s country 
of origin or the less the per capita CO2 emissions, the higher is the stated importance of equity 
issues (particularly regarding a very high importance) in international climate policy. 
To provide further insights and to examine whether there are real effects or only relationships, 
we econometrically analyze the determinants of the stated importance of equity issues in 
 10
international climate negotiations importance with binary and ordinal probit models.4 Table 4 
reports the estimation results in different ordinal probit models with the dependent variable 
“Importance” as described above. According to this, “G77/China” has a strong positive and 
“GDP per capita” and “CO2 per capita” have a strong negative effect at the 1% level of 
significance when “GDP” is not included as control variable in probit models (1), (2), and (3). 
When “GDP” is included as control variable in probit models (4), (5), and (6), the effect of 
these economic or emission performance variables is weaker, potentially due to 
multicollinearity problems since “GDP” is strongly correlated with the economic and 
emission performance variables. However, the influence holds at the 10% level of 
significance for “GDP per capita” and even at the 5% level of significance for “G77/China” 
and “CO2 per capita”. Interestingly, neither “Social science” nor “Gender” or “NGO” have 
any significant effect, whereas the agent’s age has a positive effect on the importance of 
equity mostly at the 5% level of significance (and “COP” a weakly significantly negative 
influence in two probit models).  
We complement this analysis by considering the estimation results in different binary probit 
models in Table 5. The dependent variable is the dummy variable “Very high importance” as 
aforementioned. These estimation results widely confirm the corresponding main results in 
the ordinal probit model in Table 4: “G77/China” has a strong positive and “GDP per capita” 
and “CO2 per capita” have a strong negative effect mostly at the 1% level of significance even 
when “GDP” is included as control variable.5 
 
4.2 The incorporation of equity rules in future international climate agreements  
After studying the general importance of equity issues, we now analyze what agents involved 
in international climate policy associate with the notion of equity. Table 6 reports which of 
the four main equity rules (egalitarian, sovereignty, polluter-pays, or ability-to-pay) comes 
nearest to the personal definition of equity in international climate negotiations. Table 7 
reports the desired application of the accompanying equity rules (poor losers and stand alone) 
in international climate negotiations.  
                                                          
4 The corresponding maximum likelihood estimations (as well as the descriptive statistics discussed above) have 
been performed with the software package STATA. In doing so, the so-called robust estimations of the standard 
deviation of the parameter estimates (White, 1982) are considered to calculate the z-statistics (for details see the 
STATA handbooks). 
5 We have also analyzed the determinants of “very high or high importance” in a binary probit model (the 
estimation results are available upon request). Consistently with the descriptive statistics in Table 3, only “CO2 
per capita” has a weakly significantly negative effect. 
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According to Table 7, the poor losers principle is more attractive than the stand alone 
criterion. While 52% of the respondents state an application of the stand alone rule, the 
corresponding relative frequency for the poor losers rule is over 85%.6 Table 6 shows that 
almost half of the respondents state that the polluter-pays rule comes nearest to their personal 
definition of equity in international climate negotiations, followed by the egalitarian rule 
(22.70%) and the ability-to-pay rule (20%). Surprisingly, only 7.57% of the respondents state 
that the sovereignty principle comes nearest to their personal definition of equity. Although 
this principle is not perceived as an appropriate equity or fairness rule, its frequent use in 
international environmental agreements could potentially be explained by its relatively easy 
implementation: Emission data are usually better available than estimates of abatement costs. 
This equity rule could therefore serve as a proxy of the desired polluter-pays rule. The more a 
country emits, the larger are the required reductions and thus, approximately, the share of 
costs this country has to bear. 
Table 6 shows differences in the acceptance of the respective equity rules due to the 
respondent’s country:7 Compared with respondents from other countries, respondents from 
G77/China countries put even more emphasis on the polluter-pays rule (56.47% vs. 44%) and 
less on the egalitarian rule (17.65% vs. 27%). The weaker acceptance of the egalitarian rule 
may seem surprising as the comparisons of per capita emissions are frequently stressed by 
delegates from developing countries. However, the acceptance of the egalitarian, the polluter-
pays, and the ability-to-pay rules are in line with economic self-interest as long as the 
individual’s country is poor and has small per capita emissions. Similar to the discussion on 
the sovereignty principle, it is therefore possible that the allocation-based egalitarian rule is 
stressed in international climate negotiations because it is easier to implement than outcome-
based criteria. 
We now complement the analysis of the equity rules with the consideration of the desired 
degree of incorporation of each equity principle in any future international climate agreement 
in both a short-term time horizon of no more than 20 years and a long-term time horizon of 
more than 20 years. Table 8 reports the corresponding absolute and relative frequencies. In 
accordance with the results in Table 6, the polluter-pays rule is also most attractive amongst 
                                                          
6 It is remarkable that the relative frequencies for agents from G77/China countries and for agents from other 
countries are nearly identical for each accompanying equity principle.  
7 We have also performed an analysis with multinomial logit models regarding the determinants of the 
acceptance of these four main equity rules (the estimation results are available upon request). This econometric 
analysis shows a weakly positive influence significant influence of “GDP per capita” (but not of “CO2 per 
capita”, and in contrast to the results in Table 6 not of “G77/China”) on the acceptance of the egalitarian 
principle, however, only compared with the acceptance of the polluter-pays principle. 
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all main equity rules regarding the degree of incorporation in any future international climate 
agreement, independently of the time horizon. There is virtually no difference between the 
attractiveness of the egalitarian and the sovereignty rule in the short term. However, the 
desired degree of incorporating the egalitarian rule strongly increases in a long-term time 
horizon (regarding the relative frequencies for “Very high degree” from 11.96% to 23.78% 
and for “High degree” from 18.48% to 29.73%). As in Table 7, the poor losers rule is 
considered an important accompanying equity principle. The support for this rule, however, 
decreases in a long-term time horizon (for “Very high degree” from 41.30% to 27.96%). 
The results in Table 8 suggest an interesting comparison with the prominent approach of 
“contraction and convergence” in defining the allocation of abatement burdens across 
countries. This approach would combine the sovereignty rule (similar in consequences to the 
polluter-pays rule) in the short-run with the egalitarian rule in the long-run. The tendency of 
the results in Table 8 indicates that such an approach, in particular combined with the poor 
losers rule in the short-run, could gain support for future international climate policy.  
To provide further insights, we econometrically analyze the desired degree of incorporation of 
the respective equity principles with different ordinal probit models considering the dummy 
variable “Degree” as dependent variable for each equity rule. Tables 9 and 10 (for a short-
term time horizon) and Tables 11 and 12 (for a long-term time horizon) report the 
corresponding estimation results. The tables report the estimation results in probit models 
which include the economic performance variables “G77/China” and “GDP per capita”. The 
corresponding estimation results with the emission performance variable “CO2 per capita” are 
available upon request.  
Regarding these economic performance variables in a short-term time horizon, Tables 9 and 
10 show that “G77/China” has a positive effect on the degree of incorporation of the poor 
losers rule and “GDP per capita” a negative effect on the degree of incorporation of the 
polluter-pays and the poor losers rules at the 5% level of significance, respectively. These 
estimation results and also the significantly negative effect of “G77/China” on the degree of 
incorporation of the sovereignty rule are consistent with pure economic self-interest. 
Regarding a long-term time horizon, the estimation results in Tables 11 and 12 further support 
the hypothesis of economic self-interest. These tables show that “GDP per capita” has a 
strongly significantly negative effect (or, alternatively, “G77/China” has a significantly 
positive effect) on the desired degree of incorporation of the poor losers rule and a less robust 
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negative influence on the desired degree of incorporation of the ability-to-pay, the polluter-
pays, or the stand alone rule.  
However, the economic performance variables have no significant influence on the degree of 
incorporation of the egalitarian rule in the short-run and, contrary to economic intuition, 
“G77/China” even has (in accordance with the descriptive statistics in Table 6) a negative 
influence at the 5% level of significance in the long-run. This points to the possibility that the 
personal perception of equity issues in international climate policy may not be exclusively 
determined by economic self-interest, but can also be influenced by real fairness 
considerations since non-G77/China countries do not benefit from the incorporation of the 
egalitarian rule in any future international climate agreement. Furthermore, the effect of the 
economic performance variables on the desired degree of incorporating the polluter-pays (and 
also the sovereignty principle) interestingly becomes less significant in the long-run. This 
indicates that future international climate agreements could possibly be based on a 
combination of the polluter-pays, the egalitarian, and the poor losers rules. 
To complete the analysis, it should be noted that the control variables “COP” and “Gender” 
have no significant effect on the desired degree of incorporation of any equity rule. “Social 
science” has a significantly negative influence on the degree of incorporation of the 
sovereignty rule in a long-term time horizon. In contrast, “NGO” has a strongly significantly 
positive influence on the degree of incorporation of the polluter-pays principle and a less 
robust negative influence on the degree of incorporation of the poor losers rule in a short-term 
time horizon. Finally, both in the short-run and in the long-run “Age” has a significantly 
negative effect on the degree of incorporation of the poor losers rule and (at higher levels of 
significance, respectively) of the stand alone rule.  
In further investigations we have (in accordance with the analysis of the general importance 
of equity issues as discussed above) also analyzed different binary probit models (with the 
dependent variables “Very high degree” or “Very high or high degree”) regarding the 
determinants of the desired degree of incorporation of equity rules in future international 
agreements (in both a short-term and long-term time horizon). In this respect, we have applied 
standard univariate probit models, but also (as a robustness check) multivariate probit 
models.8 The estimation results from the binary probit analysis (not displayed in this paper for 
                                                          
8 With the multivariate probit models we can account for the positive correlations between the equity rules 
regarding the desired degree of incorporation in future international agreements. However, the multivariate 
probit estimation with, for example, the four main equity rules is computationally difficult due to the occurrence 
of multiple integrals. We therefore have incorporated a simulation methods (i.e., the GHK simulator, see the 
STATA handbooks) in the maximum likelihood estimation. 
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brevity due to the enormous extent of the different estimation results, but available upon 
request) further strengthen the corresponding main estimation results from the ordinal probit 
analysis. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we empirically analyzed the importance of equity in international climate policy. 
Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate 
policy, we find that equity issues are considered highly important in international climate 
negotiations and that the polluter-pays rule and the accompanying poor losers rule are the 
most widely accepted equity principles.  
Our econometric analysis with ordinal and (uni- and multivariate) binary probit models shows 
a strong influence of the economic or emission performance of the agents’ country on the 
importance of equity issues and principles:  
• Equity issues are seen as more important by individuals from G77/China countries or from 
countries with less current per capita GDP and less future per capita CO2 emissions. 
• Agents from richer countries are less in favor of incorporating the polluter-pays and the 
ability-to-pay principle in future international climate agreements.  
• The poor losers rule is more strongly supported by individuals from G77/China countries 
or by individuals from countries with less current per capita GDP.  
These estimation results are consistent with pure economic self-interest or, in other words, 
with interests in reducing the cost burdens for the respective countries. Therefore, the question 
arises who would be willing to bear the burdens of international climate policy at all. In this 
paper, however, we have abstracted from the question of defining the aggregate emission 
reduction target and instead have focused on equity rules which might determine the burden 
sharing between countries.  
The support for the egalitarian principle runs against economic intuition (i.e., the hypothesis 
of economic self-interest): In the short-run no significant effect of the economic performance 
variables arises while agents from richer countries are even more in favor of incorporating 
this equity principle in the long-run. This points to the possibility that the personal perception 
of equity issues in international climate policy may not be exclusively determined by 
economic self-interest, but can also be influenced by real fairness considerations since non-
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G77/China countries do not benefit from the incorporation of the egalitarian rule in any future 
international climate agreement. 
Furthermore, the effect of the economic performance variables on the desired degree of 
incorporating the polluter-pays principle interestingly becomes less significant in the long-
run. Given the idea that equity or fairness arguments can be a basis for international climate 
agreements if there is a consensus of countries about what is fair, our estimation results 
indicate that future international climate agreements could possibly be based on a 
combination of the polluter-pays, the egalitarian, and the poor losers rule. 
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Appendix: Tables 
 
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of explanatory variables in the econometric analysis  
 Mean  Standard deviation Number of           
respondents 
G77/China 0.46 0.50 194 
GDP per capita 1.46  1.40 189 
CO2 per capita 2.02 1.48 193 
GDP 1.05 2.18 189 
COP 0.66 0.48 193 
Social science 0.18 0.39 181 
Age 3.80 0.24 183 
Gender 0.20 0.40 194 
NGO 0.07 0.25 189 
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Table 2: Absolute and relative frequencies concerning the stated importance of equity issues 
in international climate negotiations 
 Very high 
importance 
High        
importance 
Moderate 
importance 
Low or no 
importance 
Total 
All 70 
38.04% 
69 
37.50% 
32 
17.39% 
13 
7.07% 
184 
100% 
G77/China 44 
52.38% 
22 
26.19% 
13 
15.48% 
5 
5.95% 
84 
100% 
Non-
G77/China 
26 
26.00% 
47 
47.00% 
19 
19.00% 
8 
8.00% 
100 
100% 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients (p-values) between the stated importance of equity issues in 
international climate negotiations and the economic or emission performance of the 
respondent’s country of origin  
 Importance  Very high importance Very high or high 
importance 
G77/China 0.22***               
(0.00) 
0.27***              
(0.00) 
0.06                
(0.41) 
GDP per capita  -0.19***              
(0.01) 
-0.26***              
(0.00) 
-0.05                
(0.47) 
CO2 per capita -0.22***              
(0.00) 
-0.25***              
(0.00) 
-0.13*               
(0.09) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the null hypothesis that the appropriate correlation coefficient is zero can be rejected at 
the 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance (according to the corresponding two-tailed test). 
Number of observations varies between 179 and 184. 
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in ordered probit models, determinants 
of the stated importance of equity issues in international climate negotiations, dependent 
variable:”Importance”  
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
G77/China 0.52***  
(2.73) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
0.42** 
(2.10) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
GDP per capita --         
-- 
-0.22***     
(-2.59) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.18*      
(-1.82) 
--         
-- 
CO2 per capita --         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.20***     
(-3.21) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.19**      
(-2.23) 
GDP --         
-- 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.08**      
(-2.31) 
-0.06       
(-1.60) 
-0.03       
(-0.71) 
COP -0.32       
(-1.59) 
-0.31       
(-1.52) 
-0.34*      
(-1.66) 
-0.31       
(-1.52) 
-0.30       
(-1.47) 
-0.35*      
(-1.65) 
Social science 0.23       
(0.87) 
0.26       
(0.95) 
0.34       
(1.25) 
0.35       
(1.24) 
0.34       
(1.19) 
0.39       
(1.36) 
Age 0.66*   
(1.81) 
0.73** 
(1.96) 
0.76** 
(2.10) 
0.84** 
(2.19) 
0.84** 
(2.22) 
0.90** 
(2.36) 
Gender -0.10       
(-0.39) 
-0.12       
(-0.46) 
-0.08       
(-0.32) 
-0.12       
(-0.48) 
-0.13       
(-0.51) 
-0.08       
(-0.31) 
NGO 0.25       
(0.52) 
0.22       
(0.47) 
0.23       
(0.48) 
0.29       
(0.62) 
0.25       
(0.56) 
0.27       
(0.56) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the appropriate explanatory variable has an effect at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of 
significance. 
Number of observations = 154 in (2), (4), (5), and (6), number of observations = 157 in (1) and (3). 
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Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in binary probit models, determinants of 
the stated importance of equity issues in international climate negotiations, dependent 
variable: “Very high importance”  
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
G77/China 0.77*** 
(3.54) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
0.65***  
(2.88) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
GDP per capita --         
-- 
-0.33***     
(-3.21) 
--         
-- 
--        
-- 
-0.27**      
(-2.42) 
--         
-- 
CO2 per capita --         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.29***     
(-3.89) 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.25***     
(-2.83) 
GDP --         
-- 
--         
-- 
--         
-- 
-0.15***     
(-2.78) 
-0.14**      
(-2.22) 
-0.11       
(-1.63) 
COP -0.41*      
(-1.83) 
-0.39*      
(-1.66) 
-0.47**      
(-2.03) 
-0.37       
(-1.57) 
-0.37       
(-1.54) 
-0.43*      
(-1.81) 
Social science 0.37       
(1.24) 
0.40       
(1.33) 
0.50       
(1.62) 
0.53*     
(1.72) 
0.52* 
(1.65) 
0.57* 
(1.80) 
Age 1.05** 
(2.22) 
1.06** 
(2.22) 
1.20** 
(2.47) 
1.21** 
(2.46) 
1.19** 
(2.46) 
1.29*** 
(2.61) 
Gender 0.14  
(0.47) 
0.09  
(0.29) 
0.15  
(0.54) 
0.08  
(0.28) 
0.06  
(0.19) 
0.13  
(0.44) 
NGO 0.28       
(0.57) 
0.18       
(0.39) 
0.27       
(0.54) 
0.29       
(0.62) 
0.21       
(0.46) 
0.28       
(0.58) 
Constant -4.49       
(-2.45) 
-3.66       
(-2.00) 
-4.09       
(-2.21) 
-4.94       
(-2.61) 
-4.15       
(-2.23) 
-4.47       
(-2.35) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the appropriate explanatory variable has an effect at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of 
significance. 
Number of observations = 154 in (2), (4), (5), and (6), number of observations = 157 in (1) and (3). 
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Table 6: Absolute and relative frequencies concerning the main equity rules with respect to 
the personal definition of equity in international climate negotiations 
 Egalitarian Sovereignty Polluter-pays Ability-to-pay Total 
All 42 
22.70% 
14 
7.57% 
92 
49.73% 
37 
20.00% 
185 
100% 
G77/China 15 
17.65% 
6 
7.06% 
48 
56.47% 
16 
18.82% 
85 
100% 
Non-
G77/China 
27 
27.00% 
8 
8.00% 
44 
44.00% 
21 
21.00% 
118 
100% 
 
 
Table 7: Absolute and relative frequencies concerning the desired application of 
accompanying equity rules in international climate negotiations 
 Poor losers Stand alone 
 Yes No Total Yes No Total 
All 157 
85.79% 
26 
14.21% 
183 
100% 
78 
52.00% 
72 
48.00% 
150 
100% 
G77/China 72 
86.75% 
11 
13.25% 
83 
100% 
35 
51.47% 
33 
48.53% 
68 
100% 
Non-
G77/China 
85 
85.00% 
15 
15.00% 
100 
100% 
43 
52.44% 
39 
47.56% 
82 
100% 
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Table 8: Absolute and relative frequencies concerning the desired degree of incorporation of 
equity rules in any future international climate agreement  
Degree of incorporation in a short-term time horizon of no more than 20 years 
Equity rules Very high 
degree 
High     
degree 
Moderate 
degree 
Low      
degree 
No        
degree 
Total 
Egalitarian 22 
11.96% 
34 
18.48% 
59 
32.07% 
42 
22.83% 
27 
14.67% 
184 
100% 
Sovereignty 20 
10.93% 
36 
19.67% 
48 
26.23% 
40 
21.86% 
39 
21.31% 
183 
100% 
Polluter-
pays 
80 
43.48% 
62 
33.70% 
26 
14.13% 
9 
4.89% 
7 
3.80% 
184 
100% 
Ability-   
to-pay 
40 
22.22% 
62 
34.44% 
43 
23.89% 
23 
12.78% 
12 
6.67% 
180 
100% 
Poor losers 76 
41.30% 
52 
28.26% 
32 
17.39% 
17 
9.24% 
7 
3.80% 
184 
100% 
Stand alone 19 
11.38% 
30 
17.96% 
43 
25.75% 
34 
20.36% 
41 
24.55% 
167 
100% 
Degree of incorporation in a long-term time horizon of more than 20 years 
Equity rules Very high 
degree 
High     
degree 
Moderate 
degree 
Low      
degree 
No        
degree 
Total 
Egalitarian 44 
23.78% 
55 
29.73% 
46 
24.86% 
23 
12.43% 
17 
9.19% 
185 
100% 
Sovereignty 24 
13.11% 
38 
20.77% 
39 
21.31% 
41 
22.40% 
41 
22.40% 
183 
100% 
Polluter-
pays 
80 
42.78% 
65 
34.76% 
27 
14.44% 
6 
3.21% 
9 
4.81% 
187 
100% 
Ability-   
to-pay 
44 
23.91% 
52 
28.26% 
46 
25.00% 
28 
15.22% 
14 
7.61% 
184 
100% 
Poor losers 52 
27.96% 
55 
29.57% 
45 
24.19% 
23 
12.37% 
11 
5.91% 
186 
100% 
Stand alone 22 
12.94% 
39 
22.94% 
34 
20.00% 
31 
18.24% 
44 
25.88% 
170 
100% 
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Table 9: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in ordered probit models, determinants 
of the desired degree of incorporation of equity rules in future international climate 
agreements, short-term time horizon, dependent variable: “Degree” (for the egalitarian, the 
sovereignty, and the polluter-pays rule) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) 
Egalitarian 
 (2)  
Egalitarian
(3) 
Sove-
reignty 
(4) 
Sove-
reignty 
(5) 
Polluter-
pays 
(6) 
Polluter-
pays 
G77/China -0.16       
(-0.90) 
-- -0.36**      
(-1.97) 
-- 0.23       
(1.17) 
-- 
GDP per capita -- 0.01       
(0.18) 
-- 0.09      
(1.17) 
-- -0.19**      
(-2.35) 
COP -0.24       
(-1.26) 
-0.18       
(-0.90) 
-0.06       
(-0.36) 
0.02       
(0.10) 
-0.05       
(-0.25) 
-0.04       
(-0.18) 
Social science -0.05       
(-0.20) 
-0.05       
(-0.20) 
-0.06       
(-0.26) 
-0.06       
(-0.26) 
-0.12       
(-0.47) 
-0.06       
(-0.24) 
Age -0.06       
(-0.17) 
-0.13       
(-0.38) 
-0.09       
(-0.24) 
-0.17       
(-0.44) 
-0.05       
(-0.13) 
0.09       
(0.24) 
Gender 0.09       
(0.43) 
0.08       
(0.37) 
0.15       
(0.68) 
0.15       
(0.68) 
0.34       
(1.46) 
0.36       
(1.54) 
NGO 0.45       
(1.41) 
0.46       
(1.42) 
-0.22       
(-0.82) 
-0.19       
(-0.62) 
1.35***      
(3.03) 
1.35***      
(2.96) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the appropriate explanatory variable has an effect at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of 
significance. 
Number of observations = 159 in (1), number of observations = 156 in (2), number of observations = 157 in (3), 
and (5), number of observations = 154 in (4) and (6). 
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Table 10: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in ordered probit models, determinants 
of the desired degree of incorporation of equity rules in future international climate 
agreements, short-term time horizon, dependent variable: “Degree” (for the ability-to-pay, 
the poor losers, and the stand alone rule) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) 
Ability-  
to-pay 
 (2)  
Ability-  
to-pay 
(3) 
Poor     
losers 
(4) 
Poor     
losers 
(5) 
Stand 
alone 
(6) 
Stand 
alone 
G77/China -0.08       
(-0.48) 
-- 0.43**      
(2.19) 
 -- 0.01       
(0.03) 
-- 
GDP per capita -- -0.13*      
(-1.81) 
-- -0.20**      
(-2.47) 
-- 0.01       
(0.11) 
COP -0.15       
(-0.84) 
-0.05       
(-0.28) 
0.20       
(1.04) 
0.27       
(1.38) 
-0.17       
(-0.95) 
-0.14       
(-0.79) 
Social science 0.08       
(0.32) 
0.13       
(0.55) 
0.15       
(0.56) 
0.16       
(0.59) 
0.10       
(0.38) 
0.11       
(0.41) 
Age 0.01       
(0.02) 
-0.02       
(-0.05) 
-0.93**      
(-2.46) 
-1.08***     
(-2.94) 
-0.72*      
(-1.74) 
-0.71*      
(-1.66) 
Gender 0.16       
(0.68) 
0.14       
(0.62) 
0.14       
(0.68) 
0.07       
(0.33) 
-0.03       
(-0.10) 
-0.02       
(-0.06) 
NGO 0.04       
(0.16) 
0.05       
(0.16) 
-0.49       
(-1.52) 
-0.58*      
(-1.74) 
0.07       
(0.25) 
0.08       
(0.28) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the appropriate explanatory variable has an effect at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of 
significance. 
Number of observations = 153 in (1), number of observations = 150 in (2), number of observations = 157 in (3), 
number of observations = 155 in (4), number of observations = 142 in (5), number of observations = 139 in (6). 
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Table 11: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in ordered probit models, determinants 
of the desired degree of incorporation of equity rules in future international climate 
agreements, long-term time horizon, dependent variable: “Degree” (for the egalitarian, the 
sovereignty, and the polluter-pays rule) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) 
Egalitarian 
 (2)  
Egalitarian
(3) 
Sove-
reignty 
(4) 
Sove-
reignty 
(5) 
Polluter-
pays 
(6) 
Polluter-
pays 
G77/China -0.40**      
(-2.21) 
-- 0.02       
(0.10) 
-- 0.25       
(1.30) 
-- 
GDP per capita -- 0.12       
(1.53) 
-- -0.11       
(-1.46) 
-- -0.16 *      
(-1.80) 
COP 0.16       
(0.88) 
0.24       
(1.27) 
-0.23       
(-1.23) 
-0.13       
(-0.68) 
-0.12       
(-0.62) 
-0.10       
(-0.48) 
Social science -0.17       
(-0.67) 
-0.19       
(-0.73) 
-0.57**      
(-2.40) 
-0.54 **     
(-2.23) 
-0.18       
(-0.65) 
-0.13       
(-0.48) 
Age -0.25       
(-0.67) 
-0.35       
(-0.96) 
-0.03       
(-0.09) 
-0.11       
(-0.31) 
-0.34       
(-0.97) 
-0.25       
(-0.71) 
Gender 0.09       
(0.40) 
0.09       
(0.37) 
0.12       
(0.57) 
0.10      
(0.49) 
0.09       
(0.40) 
0.10       
(0.42) 
NGO 0.03       
(0.08) 
0.07       
(0.18) 
0.41       
(1.34) 
0.40       
(1.30) 
0.34       
(0.85) 
0.31       
(0.76) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the appropriate explanatory variable has an effect at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of 
significance. 
Number of observations = 158 in (1), number of observations = 155 in (2), number of observations = 157 in (3) 
and (6), number of observations = 154 in (4), number of observations = 160 in (5). 
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Table 12: Maximum likelihood estimates (z-statistics) in ordered probit models, determinants 
of the desired degree of incorporation of equity rules in future international climate 
agreements, long-term time horizon, dependent variable: “Degree” (for the ability-to-pay, the 
poor losers, and stand alone rule) 
 
Explanatory 
variables 
(1) 
Ability-  
to-pay 
 (2)  
Ability-  
to-pay 
(3) 
Poor     
losers 
(4) 
Poor     
losers 
(5) 
Stand 
alone 
(6) 
Stand 
alone 
G77/China 0.03       
(0.18) 
-- 0.46**      
(2.51) 
-- 0.28       
(1.52) 
-- 
GDP per capita -- -0.18**      
(-2.14) 
-- -0.30***     
(-3.65) 
-- -0.13*      
(-1.72) 
COP -0.16       
(-0.83) 
-0.06      
(-0.30) 
0.18       
(0.92) 
0.27       
(1.34) 
-0.06       
(-0.31) 
-0.01       
(-0.07) 
Social science 0.02       
(0.08) 
0.07       
(0.29) 
-0.11       
(-0.52) 
-0.05       
(-0.23) 
-0.16       
(-0.62) 
-0.12       
(-0.44) 
Age -0.34       
(-0.98) 
-0.39       
(-1.08) 
-0.86***     
(-2.60) 
-0.96 ***     
(-2.88) 
-0.74 **     
(-2.06) 
-0.70*      
(-1.88) 
Gender 0.16       
(0.69) 
0.14       
(0.63) 
0.29       
(1.32) 
0.24       
(1.10) 
-0.39       
(-1.51) 
-0.40       
(-1.53) 
NGO 0.11       
(0.32) 
0.09       
(0.26) 
0.03       
(0.10) 
-0.08       
(-0.23) 
0.16       
(0.48) 
0.13       
(0.40) 
 
Notes:  
*** (**, *) means that the appropriate explanatory variable has an effect at the 1% (5%, 10%) level of 
significance. 
Number of observations = 157 in (1), number of observations = 154 in (2), number of observations = 159 in (3), 
number of observations = 156 in (4), number of observations = 146 in (5), number of observations = 143 in (6). 
  
 
